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We present a multi-partite protocol in a counterfactual paradigm. In counterfactual quantum
cryptography, secure information is transmitted between two spatially separated parties even when
there is no physical travel of particles transferring the information between them. We propose here
a tripartite counterfactual quantum protocol for the task of certificate authorization. Here a trusted
third party, Alice, authenticates an entity Bob (e.g., a bank) that a client Charlie wishes to securely
transact with. The protocol is counterfactual with respect to either Bob or Charlie. We prove its
security against a general incoherent attack, where Eve attacks single particles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose a client (Charlie) wishes to undertake a busi-
ness transaction with a bank Bob. Charlie looks up
Bob’s website via an internet search but is unsure of the
website’s authenticity. His transaction requires him to
securely transmit confidential information to Bob. A
solution to this frequently encountered problem in e-
commerce is certificate authorization (CA) where Alice,
a well-known trusted third party validates Bob’s web-
site on request from Charlie. Classically, this task is ac-
complished via digital signatures and public-private keys
[1, 2].
Alice, as a certificate authority, has a mutual agree-
ment with a financial firm, whereby the latter provides
her with the current information about Bob’s claimed
online identity. Upon verifying that the website indeed
belongs to Bob, Alice issues certificates in the form of
digital signatures and public-private keys, thereby vali-
dating Bob’s website. Charlie can now transact with Bob
using the latter’s certified public key. Alice keeps herself
updated regarding the renewal and expiry of certificates
and current information of the certificate holders. For
example, if Bob changes the name of his website, the
certificate issued to the website becomes invalid. To re-
sume transactions, he needs to submit an application for
a new certificate including legal documents supporting
the change.
Here we wish to introduce a quantum method to ac-
complish the above described task in the counterfac-
tual paradigm which we call counterfactual quantum cer-
tificate authorization (CQCA). Counterfactual quantum
cryptography [3–5] is based on the idea of interaction-
free measurements [6, 7], which involves communicating
information even without the physical transmission of a
particle, a point that is of foundational interest [8]. Infor-
mation is transferred by blocking rather than transmit-
ting a particle. While this is also possible classically, in
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the classical case, the blockade results in a particle detec-
tion near the blockade, whereas in the quantum case by
virtue of single particle nonlocality, the particle may be
detected away from the blockade, which is the counterfac-
tual element here. Counterfactual protocols use orthog-
onal states for encoding bits [9–11]. Its security has been
analyzed by various authors [12–15], and issues related
to improving its efficiency [16] and experimental realiza-
tion by others [17–20], including a fully counterfactual
version of the Noh 2009 (N09) protocol using a Mach-
Zehnder interferometer setup [21]. The present authors
proposed a semicounterfactual quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocol to clarify the origin of security in the
counterfactual paradigm [22].
In the proposed CQCA protocol, Alice, in certifying
Bob to Charlie, enables the latter two to share a secure
random key. In this respect, the quantum version differs
from classical CA, where Alice plays no role in the se-
cure communication between Bob and Charlie. Thus the
security must be considered with respect to both a mali-
cious eavesdropper Eve as well Alice, who could overstep
her CA role and try to eavesdrop on their transaction.
The article is structured as follows: In Sec. (II), a
protocol for CQCA is presented. In Sec. (III), we prove
its security in the case of a general incoherent attack by
Eve, and a semihonest Alice. In the Sec. (IV), we provide
a summary and conclusions.
II. A PROTOCOL FOR CA
Alice, Bob and Charlie are assumed to be online on
both a conventional classical as well as a quantum net-
work. Charlie sends a classical request to certificate au-
thority Alice, whose station is equipped with a single-
photon source (SPS) and a beam splitter (BS) (Fig. 1).
After classically acknowledging Charlie and classically
intimating Bob about Charlie’s contact, Alice initiates
the protocol on a quantum channel by transmitting to
them a packet that consists of a single photon, which is
split at BS into the channels that lead to Bob (arm B)
and Charlie (arm C). We label these particles B and C.
Each transmission packet is hybrid in nature, consisting
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2of a classical (bits) and a quantum (qubits) part, will
contain a classical header, a hybrid body, and a possible
classical footer. The header contains instructions about
the type of data the packet is carrying, including packet
length, packet number, and the origin and destination of
the packet. The footer consists of a couple of bits that
indicate to the receiving device the termination of the
packet. Thus, the header and the footer hold control in-
formation for negotiating the network, while the body
will house the quantum data as well as other possible
conventional classical information.
A single photon of arbitrary polarization emitted from
SPS is represented after BS by
|Ψ〉BC = 1√
2
(|0〉B |ψ〉C + i|ψ〉B |0〉C), (1)
where the first (second) ket refers to the transmitted (re-
flected) or Charlie (Bob) arm.
Bob and Charlie each possess a photon-number resolv-
ing detector DB and DC , respectively, that absorbs the
photon by process A, and a Faraday mirror that applies
operation F , which is to reflect the photon without intro-
ducing an additional phase. The operation A is assumed
to be equipped with spectral filtering to time-resolve mul-
tiple photon arrivals. Each of the participants randomly
applies the operation F (reflect) or A (absorb). The fol-
lowing possibilities arise: (1) Bob and Charlie both ap-
ply F , which results in detection at the detector D2 with
probability 1. (2) Bob (Charlie) applies F (A) or vice
versa. With probability 14 the particle is detected at D1
or at D2, and with probability
1
2 , it is absorbed at DB
or DC . (3) If Bob and Charlie both apply A, then there
is necessarily a detection at either DB or DC .
The corresponding probabilities are summarized in Ta-
ble I. Bob and Charlie adopt the convention whereby Al-
ice’s D1 detection when they apply (AF ) ((FA)) corre-
sponds to a 0 (1) secret bit. The efficiency of the protocol
can be calculated as: P (D1) = P [D1|(F,A)]P [(F,A)] +
P [D2|(F,A)]P [(F,A)] = (1/4)(1/4) + (1/4)(1/4) = 1/8.
TABLE I: Probabilities for outcomes corresponding to Bob’s
and Charlie’s actions.
Bob and Charlie F A
F (D2, 1) (D1,
1
4
), (D2,
1
4
),
(NULL, 1
2
)
A (D1,
1
4
), (D2,
1
4
), (NULL,1)
(NULL, 1
2
)
We present the basic protocol: (1) Upon receiving
Bob’s classical, authenticated request and Charlie’s con-
sent, Alice injects n single photons sequentially into the
input port of the BS. (2) Bob and Charlie randomly ap-
ply operations F or A in the arms B and C, respec-
tively. (3) On the n outcome data collected, a fraction nf
(where f < 1) is randomly selected by Bob and Charlie
(by discussion over an authenticated classical channel),
for which they ask Alice to announce her detection data
(which can be NULL, D1 , or D2). Bob and Charlie
announce their settings (A or F ) and outcome (in case
of A, as to whether a photon was registered or not in
their respective detector DB or DC) information. Bob
and Charlie determine whether the obtained experimen-
tal data is sufficiently close to the probabilities in Table
I. If yes, then the anticorrelated settings corresponding
to the D1 detections form a secure secret key shared be-
tween them. The protocol is counterfactual in the sense
that when a secret bit is generated due to D1 detections,
the photon would not have physically traveled along one
of the arms, i.e., it did not physically travel via the Bob
arm or Charlie arm, even though both their choices con-
tribute to the bit generation.
(4) The closeness of the experimental data to the pat-
tern in the table I is estimated using the figures of merit
given below:
Coincidence count They verify that the fraction of co-
incidence detections when both Bob and Charlie
apply A
κ ≡ P (DBDC |AA) (2)
is sufficiently close to 0.
Visibility check. The visibility of the interference
fringes
V ≡ P (D2|FF )− P (D1|FF )
P (D1|FF ) + P (D2|FF ) (3)
must be sufficiently close to 1.
Bias check. The bias in Alice’s outcomes when their
settings are anti-correlated
B = max{|P (D1|AF )− P (D2|AF )| ,
|P (D1|FA)− P (D2|FA)|} (4)
must be sufficiently close to 0.
Determining error rate. The secret bits shared be-
tween Bob and Charlie are generated precisely
when a honest Alice announces a D1 detection, for
ideally in this case their inputs are anti-correlated.
Deviation from this pattern allows them estimate
the error rate on the raw key:
e ≡ P (FF |D1) + P (AA|D1), (5)
which must be sufficiently close to 0.
Estimating multi-photon pulses and channel losses.
Two other figures of merit are estimates on r, the
rate of multiple count, which may be due to dark
counts or certain photon-number non-preserving
attacks [22], and λ, transmission loss rate over the
channel.
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FIG. 1: (Color line)Experimental set-up for CQCA using a
Michelson-type interferometer: Alice’s module consists of the
single-photon source (SPS), which initiates the protocol by
sending photons through the beamsplitter BS via optical cir-
culator OC. This splits each photon into branches along Bob’s
arm (B) and (C). The optical delay OD maintains the phase
by compensating for the path-difference in the two arms. Bob
(Charlie) randomly applies either absorption (A) using detec-
tor DB (DC) or reflection (F ) using a Faraday mirror.
(5) In the above, if any of κ,V, B, e and the other fig-
ures of merit are not sufficiently close to their expected
value, then Bob and Charlie abort the protocol run. Oth-
erwise, the remaining approximately (1− f)n/8 bits cor-
responding to Alice’s D1 detection are used for further
classical post-processing to extract a smaller secure key
via key reconciliation and privacy amplification.
III. SECURITY
In classical CA, Alice only certifies the digital signa-
ture and is by definition trustworthy. By contrast, in the
present quantum case, Alice participates in the key gen-
eration. Thus, in principle, we may assume that she is
not to be trusted completely. More precisely, her action
may be characterized as semi-honest in that she fulfils her
CA role per the official protocol, but may collude with
Eve (Sec. III A) to extract key information. Our study of
the proof of security therefore first examines protection
against a semihonest Alice, while Sec. III B considers the
case of malicious Eve.
A. Security against semihonest Alice
To eavesdrop, suppose Alice transmits single photons
along both arms B and C, and infer Bob’s and Char-
lie’s choices deterministically according to whether the
respective particle returns to her or not. This is foiled
by the coincidence check, where Bob and Charlie would
find coincidence counts when they apply AA.
Alice gains nothing by sending photons along one of
the arms. Even though she gains full information on ei-
ther Bob’s or Charlie’s choice, she would know nothing
about the other’s choice, so that her information on the
potential secret bit is nil. Suppose, irrationally, that she
does launch such an attack, by sending a particle to Bob
alone. If she receives it back, then Bob applied F , and if
not, he applied A. In the latter case, in step (3) of the
protocol, the only outcome consistent with the experi-
ment is that Alice should announce NULL, given that
Bob has a detection. Hence no secret bit is generated.
Now, in the former case, Charlie may have ap-
plied F or A with equal probability. Further, in
the second case, Charlie could not have detected a
particle. If we now consider the cases FA and
FF such that Charlie did not detect a photon on
DC , then Alice should obtain outcome D1 with prob-
ability P (C→A)P (D1|FA′) + P (C→F )P (D1|FF ) =
1
2P (D1|FA′) + 12P (D1|FF ) = 12 12 + 0 = 14 , and
outcome D2 with probability P (C→A)P (D2|FA′) +
P (C→F )P (D2|FF ) = 12P (D2|FA′) + 12P (D2|FF ) =
1
2
1
2 +
1
2 · 1 = 34 , where A′ denotes that Charlie applied
A and did not detect a photon. Now Alice needs to fake
the statistics to be compatible with the honest protocol.
Suppose Alice randomly generates numbers 0 and 1 with
probability 14 and
3
4 , and announces D1 (D2) when she
obtains 0 (1). Her announcement of D1 will determin-
istically lead to an error if Charlie had applied F [since
P (D1|FF ) = 0]. In this fake attack, Alice does not know
what Charlie’s operation was irrespective of whether she
outputs D1 or D2, and so P (C → F |D1) = 12 . A simi-
lar argument applies if Alice sends a particle to Charlie
alone. Thus if Alice transmits such single-path particles
to Bob or Charlie with probability p, then from Eq. (5)
and Table I, we see that Bob and Charlie will detect an
error with probability e = P (A → D1) 12 = p4 12 = p8 . To
counter this, Alice may choose to announce only D2, in
which case e = 0, but bias B = 2× p4 = p2 . Thus such an
attack by Alice will be detected in the bias check.
B. Security against Eve
The above checks rule out Alice from deviating from
the honest protocol, though she may still collude with
Eve (i.e., Alice is constrained to be semihonest). The last
check mentioned above is intended to guarantee that the
SPS and the channel deliver the required performance.
Therefore, in this analysis we do not take into account at-
tacks by Eve based on channel losses or imperfect sources.
We discuss the security scenario where Eve attacks
each run individually, by entangling the light along both
the arms with a separate probe positioned near either
arm. These probes E1 and E2 are prepared in the ini-
tial ready state |R〉E1 |R〉E2 . During the transmission
4from Alice to Bob-Charlie, Eve applies the (number-
preserving) interaction [22] on the joint BE1 and CE2
systems:
K = |0〉j〈0| ⊗K0 + |1〉j〈1| ⊗K1, (6)
such that 〈0|K†1K0|0〉 ≡ 〈y|n〉 = cos(θj), where j ∈
{B,C}. For simplicity, we assume θB = θC = θ. This
interaction produces the state.
|Ψ′〉BCE = K|Ψ〉BC |RR〉E = 1√
2
(|ψ〉B |0〉C |y, n〉E
+ |0〉B |ψ〉C |n, y〉E), (7)
where we use the notation E ≡ E1E2. The Bob-Charlie
action (F, F ) leaves the |Ψ〉BCE unchanged. In the case
of Bob and Charlie applying (F,A), the resulting states
are 1√
2
|0〉B |0〉C |n, y〉E or 1√2 |ψ〉B |0〉C |y, n〉E , of which the
former implies detection by Bob and the latter leads po-
tentially to a D1 detection for secret bit 1. In the case
of (A,F ), the resulting states are 1√
2
|0〉B |0〉C |y, n〉E or
1√
2
|0〉B |ψ〉C |n, y〉E , of which the former implies detec-
tion by Charlie and the latter leads potentially to a D1
detection for secret bit 0. The attack does not affect the
probability for secret bit generation, which remains, as
in Table I
P (D1|AF ) = P (D1|FA) = 1
4
(8)
That Eve does not gain on attacking the return leg ap-
plies here too as in semicounterfactual QKD [22].
Thus, the most general incoherent number-preserving
attack (which entails a channel’s losslessness) that Eve
can launch would be to use the above onward leg attack,
and then measure her probe E1E2 after Alice’s announce-
ment. The timings of pulses transmitted by Alice must
be random, for if Eve knew the transmission schedule, she
would use an Alice-like setup to probe Bob’s or Charlie’s
setting by inserting a photon into the stream B or C in
synchrony with Alice, and checks if it returns or not. In
principle, this trojan horse attack can be detected using
spectral filtering [13]. An alternative is to exploit the fact
that coding here is not polarizationbased, and to use a
Bennett-Brassard-1984-like [23] check [22]. However, the
security here is undermined if Alice colludes with Eve by
supplying her with the polarization information.
In our analysis, we assume the worst-case scenario
where Eve has complete knowledge of the transmission
schedule between Alice and Bob. Thus she times her at-
tack to happen just when the particle is about to enter
Bob’s station, and completes it after Alice’s announce-
ment of D1 detection events.
Eve jointly measures her probes E1 and E2, the in-
formation she extracts being dependent on her ability to
distinguish between states |y, n〉E and |n, y〉E . From Eq.
(7), an upper bound on her information is the Holevo
quantity
χ(θ) = S
(
Π|n,y〉 + Π|y,n〉
2
)
−1
2
[
S
(
Π|y,n〉
)
+ S
(
Π|n,y〉
)]
,
(9)
where S(·) denotes von Neumann entropy and Π|x〉 the
projector to state |x〉. The square-bracketed quantity in
Eq. (9) vanishes because of the purity of the considered
states. The reduced density matrix of E1E2 in Eq. (7)
is:
ρE =
1
2
 2 cos2(θ) cos(θ) sin(θ) cos(θ) sin(θ)cos(θ) sin(θ) sin2(θ) 0
cos(θ) sin(θ) 0 sin2(θ)
 ,
(10)
in the basis {|y, y〉, |y, y⊥〉, |y⊥, y〉}, leaving out |y⊥, y⊥〉,
which lies outside the support of ρE . The above matrix
is of rank 2, whose non-vanishing eigenvalues are e1 =
1
4 [1 − cos(2θ)] and e2 = 14 [3 + cos(2θ)], so that Eve’s
information IE ≡ IBE = ICE , using Eq. (9), is
IE ≤ χ(θ) = H(e1) = H
(
1− cos(2θ)
4
)
, (11)
where H(x) ≡ −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) denotes
the Shannon binary entropy.
Let us consider the disturbance caused by Eve. In
the given direction of polarization of the photon, Alice’s
beam splitter may be represented as:
d†1 =
1√
2
(b† + ic†)
d†2 =
1√
2
(b† − ic†), (12)
where a†, b† are the creation operators for the modes
A,B, respectively, and d†1 and d
†
2 are creation operators
corresponding to detections at D1 and D2, respectively.
Hence, the state |φ〉AB evolves to
|Ψ′〉 → 1√
2
(
(|D1〉+ |D2〉)BC√
2
|y, n〉E
+
(|D1〉 − |D2〉)BC√
2
|n, y〉E
)
, (13)
from which, it follows that
Prob(D2|FF ) = 1
4
|||y, n〉E − |n, y〉E ||2
=
1
2
sin2(θ). (14)
We thus find that the visibility (3), conditioned on both
applying F , falls from 1 to
V = 1 + cos(2θ)
2
, (15)
where, by the assumption of channel losslessness,
P (D1|FF ) + P (D2|FF ) = 1. The error rate e in Eq.
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FIG. 2: The falling curve represents IB = IC (in this sym-
metric model, where Eve attacks both arms with the same
strength, parametrized by θ), while the rising curve repre-
sents IE .
(5) becomes, by Bayesian rule,
e = P (FF |D1) = P (D1|FF )P (FF )
P (D1)
=
sin2(θ)
1 + sin2(θ)
(16)
so that the mutual information between Bob and Charlie
is
IBC = 1−H(e). (17)
The condition for positive key rate in the protocol is [24]
K = IBC −min{IBE , ICE} > 0, (18)
where K is the secret bits that can be distilled after Bob
and Charlie perform key reconciliation and privacy am-
plification. The security condition (18) becomes, from
Eqs. (11), (16) and (17),
H
(
1− cos(2θ)
4
)
+H
(
sin2(θ)
1 + sin2(θ)
)
< 1, (19)
or θ . 0.42 rad, which, in view of Eq. (16), implies
e . 14.25% (see Fig. 2).
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Here we have extended the concept of counterfactual
cryptography to the multipartite scenario, by introducing
the task which is the quantum version of CA. We have
analyzed its security against general incoherent attacks.
A practical implementation of the present protocol is fea-
sible, given the existing experimental realization of coun-
terfactual QKD [17–21]. CQCA can also be derived from
the N09 protocol, just as the present protocol is derived
from the semicounterfactual QKD protocol of Ref. [22].
The latter offers a practical advantage over the former
in that it does not use polarization encoding, unlike the
former. We remark that a noncounterfactual quantum
CA scheme can be obtained using two-particle entangle-
ment and the idea of a cryptographic switch [25]. It will
be interesting to study the security of such a protocol, as
compared with the present CQCA scheme.
Finally, the above protocol for CQCA is, as noted,
counterfactual in the sense that one of the two coplayers
transmits information via interaction-free measurement,
but not both. Thus, Eve has full access to Alice’s pho-
ton, and the relationship between counterfactuality and
security appears to be less strong than in the Noh pro-
tocol. It would be an interesting open problem to find
a multipartite quantum cryptographic protocol that is
counterfactual in this latter sense.
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